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The Proving Ground: 
The Decline of Slavery and the Emergence of Black Codes in Antebellum Delaware 
 
Justin Muchnick 
Stanford University (Stanford, CA) 
 
 
Introduction: Delaware as Proving Ground 
 
President Lincoln thought that he had a great idea—a great idea that involved Delaware. 
Shots had been fired at Fort Sumter seven months earlier, and Lincoln was hard at work trying to 
figure out the quickest way to end this insurrection and start repairing a deeply divided but 
unquestionably intact Union. To convince everyone to move past this rebellion, Lincoln believed 
that he needed to propose and successfully demonstrate an economically viable model for 
eliminating slavery. Historian Allen C. Guezlo sums up Lincoln’s thought process: if the 
president could find a way to get rid of slavery without eating into slaveholders’ profits, then 
“the rebels would see the handwriting on the wall, the Union would be restored, and slavery 
would be on the short road to extinction.”1  
                                                     
A brief note on terminology: I would like to take this opportunity to offer a disclaimer in line with a note in legal 
and cultural historian Martha S. Jones’ book Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in Antebellum 
America. Jones explains that she uses the “black” and “African American” interchangeably, though she recognizes 
the distinctions between the terms—the former is “a broader term that would also encompass African-descended 
people from Africa, the Caribbean, and South America” (164). I have followed this convention. Moreover, I, like 
Dr. Jones, do not intend to use either term in an effort to demean or insult any group of people, and I understand that 
race is a social construct and not a fundamental difference, biological or otherwise (164). Also, when I use the term 
“free black” in this paper, I use it only as a term of distinction from literal chattel enslavement. I recognize that 
African Americans who were nominally free were still often denied many of the rights associated with freedom (for 
instance, the right to vote). Finally, I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style’s recommendation that “African 
American” be spelled without a hyphen (8.39), unless I am quoting directly from an author who uses the hyphen. 
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  And Lincoln thought he had the mechanism to do just that. He could compensate 
slaveholders for each of their slaves, using federal money to effectively buy slaves’ freedom. 
Though modern-day analyses from historians, economists, and journalists—such as Ta-Nehisi 
Coates’ discerning polemic on this very issue2—outline the economic and social impossibility of 
compensated emancipation at the time of the Civil War, Lincoln was convinced that he could 
make it work. He just needed a place to try it. 
 In 1861, Lincoln’s options for testing out his compensated emancipation plan were 
limited to the four slave states that had not seceded (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and 
Missouri) or the District of Columbia.3 Of these, he felt that Delaware stood the best chance of 
passing a compensated emancipation act, based on the simple fact that it had the least slaves 
within its borders. In a letter to Senator James A. McDougall on March 14, 1862, Lincoln 
explained that the 1860 Census counted 1798 slaves in Delaware, so “less than one half-day’s 
cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head.”4  He 
calculated that emancipating all 432,622 slaves in the four states plus D.C. would add up to the 
cost of eighty-seven days of the war. “Do you doubt,” he asked McDougall, “that taking the 
initiatory steps on the part of those states and this District would shorten the war more than 
eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?”5 To Lincoln, the plan was an 
obvious, smart choice, and it would all work if he could prove its efficacy in Delaware. Thus, the 
tiny border state, an overlooked patch of land not quite 2000 square miles in size, became the 
                                                     
1 Guelzo, Allen C. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2004), 65. 
2 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “No, Lincoln Could Not Have ‘Bought the Slaves,’” The Atlantic, June 20, 2013, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/no-lincoln-could-not-have-bought-the-slaves/277073/. 
3 Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln to James A. McDougall, Friday, March 14, 1862, manuscript/mixed material, 
in Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833 to 1916, 1862. 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mal1502100/.  
4 Lincoln to McDougall. 
5 Lincoln to McDougall. 
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 key to Lincoln’s entire endeavor. Delaware was the proving ground, the litmus test. If Lincoln 
could point to a tangible triumph in Delaware, he could convince Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, 
and D.C. to sign on; if he could convince Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and D.C. to sign on, he 
could stop the war in its tracks. 
 But alas, Lincoln’s plan did not succeed in Delaware, where it was championed by 
Congressman George Fisher. It was predicted to fail by a single intractable vote in the state 
assembly’s House, and the proposal was duly withdrawn.6 Subsequent bids for compensated 
emancipation in the other states were likewise rejected, and Lincoln gained only a small 
consolation prize when he signed the District of Columbia Compensated Emancipation Act in 
April 1862. The president moved on and looked into a way to tackle the slavery issue from 
another angle, announcing the Emancipation Proclamation the next year, and his efforts for 
compensated emancipation have been largely overshadowed in history by his more famous 
executive order of 1863. But Lincoln got something right about his compensated emancipation 
plan: Delaware was a proving ground. And as a proving ground, Delaware has done more than 
simply signal that the border states were not going to go for compensated emancipation.  
In this paper, I will explore the question of slavery in Delaware, a place where the 
peculiar institution died not with the bang of the Thirteenth Amendment, but instead with a quiet 
whimper through the antebellum years. I will draw especially upon the excellent (but relatively 
sparsely-cited) research of historians William H. Williams and Patience Essah, whose 
monographs on slavery in Delaware were both published in 1996, but my study has also been 
informed by various other secondary materials and a particularly incisive letter penned in 1837. I 
intend to offer a synoptic but insightful look into the factors that led to the curious decline of 
                                                     
6 William H. Williams, Slavery and Freedom in Delaware, 1639–1865 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 
1996), 175. 
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 slavery in the border state of Delaware before the Civil War, as well as the black codes that 
entered in its place. And ultimately, I hope that my paper can point to the broader idea that 
Delaware in the first half of the nineteenth century was a proving ground for the treatment of 
African Americans in the wake of slavery, and that it was in Delaware, the First State, where the 
ideology of the postwar Deep South underwent its initial tests—which, unlike Lincoln’s plan for 
compensated emancipation, were unfortunately quite successful. 
 
A Changing Economy: The Decline of Slavery in Delaware 
 
To examine the racial circumstances and tensions in antebellum Delaware, it is first 
necessary to understand the driving forces behind slavery’s decline in the state. Throughout the 
seventeenth century, Swedish, Dutch, and English settlements had sprouted up in Delaware, with 
each nation jostling for prime position in a territory that relied upon a staple-crop economy.7 In 
October of 1664, though, an armed band of Englishmen ousted the Dutch by force, and the 
colony came definitively into English hands.8 While slavery—which had been introduced to 
Delaware by the Dutch earlier in the century9—played a minimal role during the first decade of 
English rule, by the 1680s the influence of the Chesapeake Bay’s lucrative tobacco market had 
completely infiltrated the colony.10 Delaware farmers, who had previously focused on growing 
wheat, slowly but surely looked to emulate the success of their counterparts in Maryland and 
Virginia. This shift happened to coincide with a period of prosperity in late seventeenth-century 
                                                     
7 Patience Essah, A House Divided: Slavery and Emancipation in Delaware, 1638–1865 (Charlottesville, VA: 
University Press of Virginia, 1996), 15–7. 
8 Essah, 18. The Dutch briefly retook Delaware between 1673–4 but were unsuccessful in their attempt to regain 
long-term control. 
9 Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 6. 
10 Essah, House Divided, 29. 
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 England, which in turn led to a decrease in young Englishmen crossing the Atlantic as indentured 
servants hoping to eventually build themselves a better life in America.11 Thus, from the outset, 
Delawareans turned almost exclusively to slave labor to work their fledgling tobacco farms.  
However, there was a uniquely Delawarean problem that surfaced during this tobacco 
boom: size. Patience Essah points out the limitations of the Chesapeake tobacco system as 
applied to Delaware, explaining that “the diminutive size of Delaware and the absence of an 
internal and external frontier” both “prevented the development of large-scale tobacco 
plantations” in the state and “denied Delaware tobacco farmers the room to escape from tobacco-
related ills.”12 Delaware simply did not have enough physical space to accommodate massive 
tobacco operations or to provide an extensive enough array of crops to fall back on during 
periodic downturns in a tobacco market that experienced year-to-year volatility. The economic 
model of the tobacco market proved unsustainable in a space as confined as Delaware, where 
farmers could not keep up with the increasingly elaborate enterprises of the other Chesapeake 
Bay colonies. 
While Delawareans enjoyed economic prosperity from their tobacco farms well into the 
first half of the eighteenth century, by the time of the Revolution it became clear that Delaware 
as a whole could not continue to compete with the major tobacco colonies. The woes of 
Delaware’s sputtering tobacco production were exacerbated by the reputation of the Delaware 
Valley crop as inferior to Maryland or Virginia tobacco—and by the lower price point associated 
with this reputation.13 These difficulties, coupled with the nearby port of Philadelphia’s position 
as a prominent place of grain exportation, led Delaware farmers to direct their efforts away from 
                                                     
11 Essah, 30. 
12 Essah, 29. 
13 Stevenson W. Fletcher, Pennsylvania Agriculture and Country Life, 1640–1840 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania 
Historical and Museum Commission, 1950), 165. 
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 tobacco and back to the wheat (and, to a lesser extent, corn) that they had grown a century ago.14 
Indeed, by 1788 there was not a single recorded commercial tobacco plantation operating in the 
state,15 but the production of wheat and corn was soaring. 
But in addition to steering the state away from direct competition with the tobacco 
powerhouses of the Chesapeake Bay, this shift to wheat and corn cut down on the manpower 
necessary to sustain a profitable farm. William H. Williams explains that tobacco “demanded 
almost daily attention” from early spring to late fall, because each individual plant needed to be 
“set in by hand in each hill [of pulverized soil], watered, and then watched closely.”16 
Conversely, wheat, once planted, could essentially be left alone until it was fully grown; corn, 
while a degree less straightforward than wheat, was still not nearly as labor-intensive as 
tobacco.17 Once Delaware farmers turned to wheat and corn, they realized that it was 
economically advantageous to seek hired help for the few busy weeks of the growing season, as 
opposed to making a year-round, long-term investment in a group of slaves who would be 
working at full capacity for only a fraction of each year.18 In this way, slaves in Delaware 
became in many cases an economic burden rather than a benefit, so—for reasons that had 
everything to do to the bottom line and nothing to do with morality—Delaware slaveholders 
reconsidered their holdings. The rate of manumissions (which had occurred with some regularity 
in Delaware since the 1740s, when the colony’s smallest farmers began to be squeezed out of the 
tobacco business) increased dramatically: while seventy percent of Delaware’s African 
                                                     
14 Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 45. 
15 Williams, 45. 
16 Williams, 44. 
17 Williams, 45. 
18 Williams, 45–6. 
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 Americans were enslaved in 1790, the state’s black population was seventy-four percent free by 
1810.19  
 
Voluntary Emancipation: Delaware’s Motivations 
 
But why did voluntary emancipation take hold in Delaware? After all, Delaware’s move 
away from slave labor was motivated by economic factors, and yet manumission was not the 
most profitable way of offloading what was to slaveowners legal property. Indeed, when 
Virginia (a state which actually transitioned away from tobacco and to wheat not long after 
Delaware, but for different reasons20) found itself with a surplus of slaves and a dearth of farm 
labor to be done, slaveowners capitalized by forcibly breeding their slaves and selling them to 
the Deep South through the brutal and lucrative domestic slave trade.21 What led Delawareans, 
keen as they usually were to take a page from their successful Virginian counterparts, to 
overwhelmingly decide to manumit rather than to sell their slaves?  
The answer can be found in a number of moral factors stemming from the influence of 
abolitionist groups and religious factions in the post-Revolution years. The proximity of 
Delaware to Pennsylvania provided (in addition to the grain port of Philadelphia that had helped 
move Delaware away from a tobacco-based economy in the first place) a model for abolitionist 
thought in the wake of the Revolution. Especially in New Castle and Kent Counties, the northern 
                                                     
19 Essah, House Divided, 36. 
20 T. H. Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve of Revolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 181. Breen notes that great farmers in Virginia were frustrated with the volatility 
of the tobacco market and often found themselves in debt due to poor speculation and, eventually, British import 
duties (178–9). Wheat had become a “second staple” of Virginia by the 1770s (181), and tobacco production in the 
state was very limited beyond the end of the eighteenth century. 
21 Maurie D. McInnis et al., “To Be Sold: Virginia and the American Slave Trade,” Library of Virginia, 2014, 
http://www.virginiamemory.com/online-exhibitions/exhibits/show/to-be-sold/introduction.  
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 two of Delaware’s three counties and thus those in closest contact with Philadelphia, citizens 
looked to emulate the beliefs of Northern cosmopolites. Indeed, between 1788 and 1800, no 
fewer than four abolition societies, some more successful than others, were founded in Delaware; 
three of these (the only three to have left written records of their proceedings) were 
headquartered in either New Castle or Kent County, largely based out of the cities of Wilmington 
(New Castle) and Dover (Kent).22 The first society, in Dover, was modeled specifically on the 
structure of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, and it sent a delegation to a conference on 
abolition in Philadelphia in 1795.23 
The emergence of these abolition societies in Delaware was due not only to the national 
discussion of liberty and freedom in the wake of the American Revolution, but also to the 
religious makeup of the state itself. Delaware, in fact, was part of Charles II’s original 1682 land 
grant to William Penn,24 which ensured strong Quaker roots in the colony (and then state) and a 
good relationship with the Quakers of Pennsylvania. Though at first the Quakers held an attitude 
toward the morality of slavery that was complex and (says Williams) ultimately “ambiguous,”25 
they became increasingly ardent abolitionists and, in the years following the Revolution, were 
flocking to abolitionist societies en masse. Therefore, the abolitionists in New Castle and Kent 
were led and organized by the counties’ sizeable Quaker population.26 
                                                     
22 Essah, House Divided, 59–60. 
23 Essah, 60. According to Essah, this society “disbanded shortly thereafter, probably for financial reasons,” but in 
its short lifespan, it petitioned the state legislature for various abolitionist measures and provided a template for 
future abolitionist groups in Delaware.   
24 Essah, 18. 
25 Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 18. 
26 Essah, House Divided, 44. The quieter but not nonexistent antislavery sentiment in Delaware’s southernmost 
county of Essex—where there was a single, albeit not well-documented, abolitionist society—was due less to the 
Quakers, whose numbers in Essex were smaller than in New Castle or Kent, than to the Methodists. The Methodists 
disavowed the institution of slavery for a brief historical moment, but by the first decades of the 1800s the sect was 
“reversing itself on the slavery issue” (56).  
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 Through these abolitionist agitators, Delaware was able to enact and defend meaningful 
legislation that not only paved the way for the dramatic uptick in manumissions but also allowed 
free African Americans to establish their own communities within the state. The Quakers won 
their first major victory in February 1787, when—following a 1786 Quaker petition—the 
Delaware state legislature passed an overtly pro-manumission law that severely restricted the 
sale of slaves out-of-state in addition to banning the importation of slaves into Delaware.27 Upon 
further pressure and petitions by Quakers and other Delaware abolitionists, a string of 
increasingly strong pro-manumission laws followed; individual acts were passed in 1789, in 
1793, and in 1797. 
Not only did these acts encourage manumission, but by increasing the population of free 
African Americans in the state, they indirectly afforded African Americans greater agency in 
Delaware courts. According to Essah, judges in Delaware began to reject the heuristic “policy of 
classifying all blacks as slaves” until proven otherwise, and by the mid-1800s more and more 
courts in the state were “put[ting] the burden of proof on those who claimed to be owners.”28 
This judicial interpretation was expressed clearly and succinctly in the 1840 Delaware Court of 
Errors and Appeals case State v. William Dillahunt.29 In this case, a pertinent side issue emerged 
when the legitimacy of the testimony of a black woman named Charlotte Green30 was called into 
question because she could not be definitively proven to be free. The court admitted her 
testimony, stating that even in the de jure slave state of Delaware, “a large majority of all 
persons of color . . . are free,” so “there is no reason to presume slavery from color.”31 In this 
                                                     
27 Essah, 40. 
28 Essah, 67. 
29 The primary focus of the case was not on race: The State v. William Dillahunt was a murder case decided on the 
distinction between mere drunkenness and mania a potu. 
30 There was no debate about whether race alone would exclude Green from testifying, as a black man was on trial. 
31 State v. William Dillahunt, 3 Del. 551 (Del. 1840). 
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 way, with the courts on their side (and, not insignificantly, with the interstate slave trade 
explicitly banned), free blacks in Delaware did not need to live with the constant specter of 
enslavement or re-enslavement looming over them. 
Consequently, free African Americans in Delaware were able to build communities 
somewhat reminiscent of those in major Northern cities.32 Williams writes of Wilmington’s 
“sizeable free African-American population that comprised an almost autonomous community 
unto itself” by the midpoint of the nineteenth century.33 Much of the African American 
community in Wilmington centered on religious life; free blacks were successful in establishing 
their own churches, the most enduring of which being the African Union Methodist Church (or 
the “Old Union”), founded in 1813.34 Then, beginning the very next year, African Americans in 
Wilmington began celebrating the Big August Quarterly (or the “Big Quarterly”), a religious and 
social gathering of free blacks spearheaded by the freed slave-turned-Old Union leader Peter 
Spencer.35 This celebration grew from its rather modest origins as a small religious service to 
become a week-long, reunion-style gathering of African Americans from not just Delaware but 
also Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where friends and extended families could catch up and 
enjoy each other’s company. A highlight for the African American people of Wilmington and 
beyond, the celebration outlasted the lifespan of its inventor; while Spencer died in 1843, the Big 
Quarterly continued to be held annually up through the Civil War years and beyond.36 Overall, 
though Wilmington’s black community was never as robust or ingrained as those of Northern 
                                                     
32 Nevertheless, even as Delaware’s free blacks built a community for themselves in Wilmington, many newly-
manumitted African Americans elected to move out-of-state, especially to Philadelphia—a much larger city with 
more job opportunities and black institutions (Essah, House Divided, 112).  
33 Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 234. 
34 Essah, House Divided, 149. 
35 Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 228. 
36 Williams, 228–9. In fact, a version of the Big Quarterly is still being held to this day: http://augustquarterly.org.  
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 urban centers like Philadelphia, free African Americans of Delaware were able to create their 
own institutions and traditions in their state’s largest city. 
 
Opposition to Abolition: Slavery Stays Legal 
 
Of course, though, a piece of this narrative is still missing. Delaware encouraged 
manumission, protected free blacks from enslavement, and to some extent provided a social 
space for black communities—so why didn’t the state just go ahead and abolish slavery entirely? 
While Quakers and other progressives lobbied for abolition—the petitions they sent throughout 
the 1780s and ‘90s all included calls for abolition, all of which were ignored37—the influence 
they exerted in New Castle County and the northern half of Kent County by no means extended 
to the southernmost Essex County. Serving as Delaware’s gateway to the South and its ideology, 
Essex County aligned itself squarely with the protection of the institution of slavery. Though by 
1840 Delaware’s slave population—disproportionately located in Essex County—had dipped 
below three thousand (or just roughly fifteen percent of the state’s entire African American 
population) and provided little net economic benefit,38 the whites of Essex County vehemently 
opposed statewide abolition, even as many of them manumitted their own slaves. In Essex 
County, at the “frontier” of Delaware and far removed from Northern urban networks and 
extensive governmental oversight, many slaveholders continued to export their slaves to the 
Deep South.39 Though this lucrative practice had repeatedly been deemed illegal by Delaware’s 
pro-manumission acts, in reality statewide enforcement of these laws was weak, and the second-
                                                     
37 Essah, 155–6. 
38 Essah, 7. 
39 Essah, 83. 
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 rate slaveocracy of Essex County was usually more than willing to turn a blind eye to any illicit 
sales.40  
But even setting aside the profits Essex County slaveholders made by unlawfully selling 
their slaves (or by kidnapping free blacks), Southern Delawareans supported the institution of 
slavery for ideological reasons. Just as cities like Wilmington looked to emulate the Northern 
metropolis of Philadelphia, so too did the rural areas of Essex County look toward the South for 
inspiration. Because they had historical ties to the tobacco industry and the Chesapeake Bay 
economy, the people of Essex County largely saw themselves as Southerners. They were willing 
to put aside any economic concerns—to practice, as Essah says, “economic backwardness41—in 
order to focus instead on their affinity with their Southern kinsmen and their shared brand of 
flagrant white supremacy and the disavowal of blacks’ claims to the most basic and fundamental 
human rights. 
With a considerable pro-slavery voting population, Essex County (with support from the 
southern localities of Kent County) was able to create a prolonged stalemate in the Delaware 
state assembly. With the Northern and Southern Delawareans at continual loggerheads, no 
political party was able to gain a stable majority in the state legislature in the antebellum years,42 
and the divided border state of Delaware could get nowhere beyond the compromise of 
encouraged but noncompulsory manumission on an individual basis. Moreover, even the 
members of New Castle and Kent Counties who did campaign for statewide emancipation often 
did so out of expediency more than altruism. They realized that showing the slightest interest in 
                                                     
40 This unlawful avenue led also to the rise in kidnapping and sale of free blacks, most notoriously by a quasi-
legendary figure named Patty Cannon, who shuttled between Essex County and Maryland and ran a “reverse 
Underground Railroad” operation for a decade until she died in custody in 1829. For a deeper discussion of Patty 
Cannon and her kidnapping ring’s activities, see Richard Bell, “‘Thence to Patty Cannon’s’: Gender, Family, and 
the Reverse Underground Railroad,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0144039X.2016.1163136. 
41 Essah, House Divided, 83. 
42 Essah, 3–4. 
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 the freedom of Delaware African Americans would garner a consistent and loyal bloc of black 
voters if abolition and suffrage (free African Americans in Delaware, treated as second-class 
citizens, did not have the right to vote43) took hold.44 Thus, many if not most of whites in 
Northern Delaware, even if they supported abolition, still harbored vehemently racist and white 
supremacist beliefs.  
Adding fuel to the fire in a city like Wilmington was the fear and animosity with which 
whites looked on as blacks built burgeoning communities for themselves—feelings which must 
have peaked every August when droves of in-state and out-of-state African Americans 
descended upon the city for the Big Quarterly. Wilmington’s local government, controlled by 
whites, thus oftentimes acted against the interests of African Americans. For example, after free 
blacks in Wilmington founded the African Benevolent Association (a charitable group aimed at 
fostering virtue and molding upstanding citizens within the African American community) in 
1820, the city of Wilmington twice denied the organization a charter of incorporation—without 
providing a reason for their decision.45 
In all, with a growing population of free blacks, a deadlocked state legislature, and an 
intensely racist climate produced by overtly pro-slavery Southern Delawareans as well as subtler 
Northern Delawareans, by the mid-1800s the state of Delaware had produced a sociopolitical 
climate hospitable to the emergence of black codes.  
 
The Black Codes: A New Avenue of Discrimination 
                                                     
43 Harold B. Hancock, “Not Quite Men: The Free Negroes in Delaware in the 1830’s [sic],” Civil War History 17, 
no. 4 (December 1971): 323, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/419025/pdf. Free blacks in Delaware would not even gain 
nominal voting rights until the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment (which Delaware, in fact, did not ratify until 
1901). 
44 Essah, 4. 
45 Essah, 145. 
45
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 Delaware’s reality, of a dwindling institution of slavery but a persistent strand of virulent 
racism, was the crucible in which the Delaware black codes were forged. This series of laws to 
institutionally marginalize and repress African Americans began via decentralized legislation 
throughout the early 1800s, taking hold as a form of race-based social control as more blacks 
were manumitted. An 1826 law, for example, “mandated that free blacks carry passes” attesting 
to their freedom46—even in New Castle County, where slavery was virtually nonexistent. Essah 
argues that the very act of forcing African Americans to carry this pass “defined free blacks as an 
‘other,’ a class inherently unequal to whites.”47 The otherization of African Americans existed as 
a symbolic alternative to slavery, a channel for discrimination in an age in which the institution 
of slavery was unpopular.  
 Restrictive racial legislation in Delaware gained its greatest force and traction in the wake 
of Nat Turner’s insurrection in Virginia in August 1831, which sparked widespread paranoia 
amongst whites (even those who did not own slaves).48 In October, there were whispers in 
Seaford, Sussex County, of a potential slave uprising—which turned out to be a group of white 
men in blackface playing a racist trick on the town.49 This hoax, in the fear it provoked in whites 
who believed the rumors, reified statewide paranoia about a black revolt, and in 1832 the state 
assembly passed its first full-force black code. This code included laws requiring African 
Americans to obtain a (nearly impossible to acquire) license before purchasing a firearm, setting 
                                                     
46 Essah, 110. 
47 Essah, 111. 
48 James E. Newton, “Black Americans in Delaware: An Overview,” in A History of African Americans of Delaware 
and Maryland’s Eastern Shore, ed. Carole Marks (Wilmington: Delaware Heritage Press, 1996), 
http://www1.udel.edu/BlackHistory/overview.html. 
49 Essah, House Divided, 118. 
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 a curfew, and limiting the number of blacks that could gather together at night.50 Petitions from 
the black community against these laws consistently fell upon deaf ears.  
 These most complete primary-source observation of Delaware’s black codes in action 
belongs to a member of the American Anti-Slavery Society named William Yates. Yates, a white 
man51 who would go on to pen a somewhat-influential legal treatise entitled The Rights of 
Colored Men in 1838,52 took a research trip to Delaware in 1837, six years after Nat Turner’s 
rebellion and well into the heyday of Delaware’s black codes. In a July 1837 letter, Yates 
explained that he had ventured down to the border state from his hometown of Troy, New York, 
to Delaware in order “to learn from personal observation the condition of the free people of 
color” in Delaware53 The letter itself was the fruit of this research trip, for after he wrote it on 
July 18, he published it in two New York newspapers: The Emancipator on August 5, and The 
Colored American on August 12. It is clear from his initial statement of purpose—to observe 
“the condition of the free people of color” in the state—that Yates in 1837 could already see that 
Delaware was a unique case, a state with a relationship toward slavery and freedom more 
muddied and complex than in the North or the South. 
 Yates wrote that he “had hoped to find slavery in Delaware merely nominal,” but that in 
reality “the so called free people of color are only nominally free.”54 Disheartened by this 
realization, Yates attempted to figure out the mechanisms Delawareans have put in place to 
                                                     
50 Essah, 119. 
51 Historian Harold B. Hancock, who edited and republished Yates’ letter in 1973, refers to Yates as black. 
However, in the introduction to Birthright Citizens, Martha S. Jones explains how through her own research she 
determined that this Yates was white. Confusion stems from the fact that at the same time lived another William 
Yates, a freed slave, who worked as a porter in the U.S. Supreme Court before becoming a leading journalist and 
political activist in San Francisco. See Jones, Birthright Citizens, 1–9, for this fascinating story of the two William 
Yateses. 
52 Jones, Birthright Citizens, 3. 
53William Yates, “Slavery, and Colored People in Delaware,” 1837, in “William Yates’s Letter of 1837: ‘Slavery, 
and Colored People in Delaware,’” ed. Harold B. Hancock, Delaware History 14 (Spring 1971): 206. 
54 Yates, 208. 
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 prevent African Americans from enjoying anything more than “a mongrel liberty, a mere mock 
freedom.”55 What he found was a system of selectively-enforced laws whose “general scope and 
design seem . . . to have been to degrade, to crush, and to render [blacks] ignorant and 
powerless.”56 In this way, not only had the Delaware legislature dismissed calls for statewide 
abolition, but it had also approved a framework for discriminatory practices that stopped short of 
slavery itself. Yates described that some of these practices, including (as discussed previously) 
turning a blind eye to the illicit kidnapping and selling activities that were occurring (although it 
is still debatable to what exact extent) in Southern Delaware. He also recorded instances of laws 
that explicitly target blacks; he noted that African Americans who came to Delaware from other 
states and stay for longer than ten days were “liable to imprisonment and sale in case of the non-
payment of the [$10 per week] fine.”57 This law, though passed three years before the inaugural 
Big Quarterly of 1814, would come to serve as a likely deterrent for many out-of-state African 
Americans deciding whether to make the trip to Delaware each August. 
But the most systemic and insidious issue, Yates perceptively pointed out, arose from the 
unequal enforcement of laws that on face value are somewhere in the realm of neutral. Yates 
wrote that the legal punishment in Delaware “for larceny and receiving stolen goods” was “sale 
as a servant”—whether the convicted is white or black.58 However, Yates indicated that for 
whites, “public opinion neutralizes the law, as the sale of a white man is merely nominal,” with a 
small fine serving as sufficient restitution.59 On the other hand, the risk of sale “of a colored man 
is real (i.e.) for consideration, and is often taken advantage of as a door to smuggle him off into 
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 perpetual bondage.”60 Yates revealed, then, how a law which was neutral in its letter could 
become weaponized against African Americans in its implementation. Thus, the specious 
appearance of legal equality61 allowed for highly discriminatory practices—the heart of the black 
codes—to occur in actuality. And so, though slavery had fallen out of widespread practice in 
Delaware, its tenets of racial oppression gained new life through the black codes.  
 
Conclusion: The Legacy of What Yates Saw 
 
In the final paragraphs of his letter, Yates expressed in no uncertain terms the dire stakes 
of the sociopolitical climate in Delaware: “Delaware is a most critical ground in the contest now 
waging between liberty and slavery, between light and darkness.”62 Delaware, thought Yates, 
had the capacity to change its policies for the better and guide states to its south into the light, but 
it was also at risk of staying the course and keeping the South enshrouded in darkness. In fact, 
Yates’ analysis might have been more prescient than even he knew: the First State was such a 
“critical ground” because it was—as Lincoln would notice for different reasons twenty-five years 
later—a proving ground. Delaware, where slavery had essentially died out due to internal 
factors, would set the example for how a slavery-friendly state could respond to the end of the 
peculiar institution.  
 Regrettably, Delaware did not take the advice of Yates, who entreated the state to 
“substitute kindness, liberality and encouragement, in the place of oppression, contempt and 
                                                     
60 Yates, 212. 
61 Although, in 1839, state assembly dispensed with the pretense of neutrality and officially expressed that whites 
convicted of stealing, unlike blacks, could not be sold into servitude (Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 193). 
62 Yates, “Slavery,” 215. 
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 exclusion.”63 Instead, it continued to champion the ideology of the black codes, whereby 
nominally free African Americans were targeted by overtly and covertly racist laws intended to 
sustain the “oppression, contempt and exclusion” of blacks. And in proving resoundingly—and 
by as early as the 1830s—that blacks could be systematically kept down by means other than the 
longstanding framework of traditionally-understood chattel slavery, antebellum Delaware 
prefigured the Deep South’s era of rampant oppression of African Americans in the postwar, 
post-abolition years. 
 Contemporary journalist Douglas A. Blackmon, in his seminal, Pulitzer Prize-winning 
book Slavery by Another Name (2008), investigates the fate of African Americans in the South in 
the years after the Civil War. Blackmon explains that peonage and the leasing of convicts to 
private companies—in other words, “slavery by another name”—effectively kept Southern 
blacks in servitude until at least World War II. Using the loophole that the Thirteenth 
Amendment “specifically permitted involuntary servitude as a punishment for ‘duly convicted’ 
criminals,”64 Southern states tried and convicted thousands of African Americans, then sold them 
to large plantations and industrial corporations to undertake back-breaking, deadly, unpaid labor 
in fields or mines or factories. 
 The laws that served to land these African Americans in prison—the laws that 
contributed to a vicious cycle of black servitude and economic immobility for nearly a century 
after the de jure end of slavery—were chillingly similar to some of the black code laws passed in 
places such as antebellum Delaware. Vagrancy, described by Blackmon as “the offense of a 
person not being able to prove at a given moment that he or she is employed,”65 was enough to 
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 condemn someone in Alabama to convict labor—provided that that someone was black. Well 
into the 1900s, vagrancy was “capriciously enforced,” and, even in times of “massive 
unemployment among all southern men, was reserved almost exclusively for black men.”66 
Vagrancy, then, and in turn the crux of Southern convict labor, was the ideological heir to a piece 
of legislation like Delaware’s larceny law, to Delaware’s system—sometimes explicit, 
sometimes tacit—of disempowering free African Americans and even selling them into (or back 
into) servitude.  
 And this, therefore, is the legacy of that overlooked patch of land not quite 2000 square 
miles in size, of that strip of soil that changed hands from the Swedish to the Dutch to the 
English, of the First State, of the Quaker outpost, of the tiny border state, of the home of the Big 
Quarterly, of Yates’ “critical ground,” of the shining example that Lincoln hoped for but never 
received. This, therefore, is the legacy of the proving ground. 
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